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Spatialized Communication: 
Future Research Perspectives on Urban
 Youth Violence and on Terrorism
Klaus Weinhauer
Violence is one of the biggest threats to urban societies. Since the advent of mass urban societies during the nineteenth century, towns and cities have 
been at the center of heated debates about urban decay, vice, crime and violence. 
Insecurity and urban conflicts even shaped early social science definitions of cities. 
In a pioneering characterisation Louis Wirth defined cities “as a relatively large, 
dense, and permanent settlement of socially heterogeneous individuals”, but added 
that the social structure of the city “tends toward the acceptance of instability and 
insecurity in the world at large as a norm”1. The French sociologist and philosopher 
Henri Lefèbvre further stressed (in 1970) that the urban environment was a “place 
of conflict and confrontation, a unity of contradictions […] where conflicts are 
expressed”2.
Violence in urban settings was often seen as a byproduct of rapid social change, 
as a consequence of social and cultural uprooting or as an individual pathology. 
Since the 1990s, a revision of these somewhat abstract and technical interpretations 
has occurred, and the act of violence itself has come under scrutiny3. Authors have 
increasingly choosen to focus on physical violence, which has been studied through a 
close look at the interactions between victims, perpetrators and bystanders. Research 
has demonstrated that everybody can act violently at any time, although Randall 
Collins has convincingly demonstrated that it is not easy to overcome the emotionally 
coded confrontational tension and fear barrier4. However, this emergent “actor-
oriented” close reading of violent interactions still needs tools which help to integrate 
practices of physical violence into broader social and cultural processes. The key 
words which point in this direction are: communication and space.
Violence is a pattern of communication, which can evoke related communication 
(Anschlusskommunikation). Especially since the emergence of modern, mass media 
societies in the nineteenth century, the communicative potentials of violence have to 
be taken seriously. Seen this way, it becomes obvious that violence is not senseless 
and has no inbuilt tendency always to escalate. Rather, there are many opportunities 
to stop or to deescalate violent communications. As I have indicated above, violent 
1  Wirth (1938, p.8 and 16).
2  Lefèbvre (1970/2003, p.175).
3  For an overview, see Weinhauer and Ellerbrock (2013).
4  Collins (2008).
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communication is performed in a triadic setting (involving at least one perpetrator and 
at least one victim, and often bystanders too, which can include the media). Violence 
is also about order. While for victims the experience of violence may reorder time 
perceptions and bodily experiences, for groups of perpetrators it may also serve to 
create order, which may enable them to act effectively. Moreover, the experience 
and practices of violence may have long term effects, as they affect individual and 
collective memories.
To analyze violent communication requires an understanding of spatial practices. 
Henri Lefèbvre’s concept of the formation of relational spaces encapsulates the 
importance of this thesis5. Space is not a given container but shaped by three 
interrelated levels, by a triad of practices: By the interaction of everyday spatial 
practices (1, perceived space), with representations of space (2, conceptualized space 
of planners, social engineers, etc.) and with representational spaces (3, a lived space, 
with its symbols, images, etc., which its users seek to appropriate and to change). 
Following this interaction, urban violence is a spatialized social and cultural practice 
influenced by individual and collective imaginations, imaginaries, memories, and by 
stories told about urban settings6. All this is by no means confined by nation state 
borders but transnationally and translocally interlinked with other spatial practices 
taking place in tight urban networks of communication. Put concisely, violence is 
less an anomaly than a communication- and space-based social practice which can 
create order and meaning(s).
If we try to put such an understanding of violence into research practice it is 
important to study which individual and which groups participate in acts of 
violence and in which urban settings such practices occur. In what follows, this 
will be accomplished via a case study of youth violence in Chicago in 1919. It is 
also important, however, to counter the (seemingly) omnipresent impression that 
urban violence only follows one pattern: that is, that it always increases in scale 
and severity. Hence, a second case study will consider urban terrorism in Northern 
Ireland and in Germany since the 1970s, as instances where political violence was 
eventually overcome and subdued. Both case studies underline that the urban is 
shaped by conflicts and that these conflicts are not only staged in the city but that 
these conflicts can also be about the city7.
URBAN YOUTH VIOLENCE: GANGS AS SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
“Violence by young people is one of the most visible forms of violence in 
society”, the World Health Organization postulated in 20028. In 2005 an US army 
publication claimed that youth violence by gangs in Central America marked a 
5  See Lefèbvre (1974/1991, p.38-40); Wood (2007).
6  Imaginaries are more stable than individual imaginations and are shaped by (contested) collective 
social and cultural images, understandings and perceptions; see Buitrago et al. (2016).
7  Castells (2016).
8  Krug et al. (2002, p.25).
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“new urban insurgency”9. Labeling acts of violence as youth violence, however, is 
analytically highly problematic. One problem is to clearly discern who falls under the 
label “youth”. The second problem is the label “gangs”. Influenced by US-American 
research, the gang perspective was since the 1920s exported on a global scale. The 
results of US-research were often uncritically applied to settings in other regions like 
Latin America, Africa but also Europe10.
Jack Katz has brilliantly criticized the pitfalls of the dominant stream of US-
gang research. The usual assumption is: where gangs exist there is more crime11. 
Many studies focus on gangs as windows into a world of disorder and decay, instead 
of studying the everyday life of gangs. Some important causal questions are not 
often addressed within the literature: Do individuals become more criminal when 
they enter a gang? Do gangs increase the level of criminal violence in a setting? 
What accounts for their emergence, spread and evolution toward more or less more 
violence? Katz raises two important claims. First, it may well be that “violence causes 
gangs much more powerfully than gangs cause violence”12. That is, that one act of 
violence may make groups into gangs. Second, gangs reduce violence since they are 
so intimidating that people may hesitate to start conflicts with them. Gangs may also 
serve to discipline violence-prone members via a ruthlessly enforced internal code of 
behavior. The activities of gangs are not, of course, solely limited to the second half 
of the twentieth century.
What follows is a case study of Chicago in 1919, where racialized urban violence 
was employed extensively by juveniles, which takes a closer look at how gangs 
might be more adequately conceptualized and at how these entities are involved in 
collective action. Globally, the years immediately following the First World War 
saw frequent collective actions which were often violent. As I have demonstrated 
elsewhere, the Great War had mobilized the respective societies and brought tremendous 
changes (restructuring of industry, food rationing, military mobilization) to working-class 
neighborhoods13. Translocal migration was an important war-induced mobilization. This 
migration not only intensified competition on the labor market but also led to competition 
over housing. All these war-induced challenges led to a mobilization of the local resources 
of the working-classes in order to cope with these situations. In a process which I call 
“localization” members of local working-class communities developed an intense spatial 
awareness which in turn activated existing (or even spawned the formation of) locally 
rooted self-help social movements14. These movements often competed with established 
working-class organizations but also used the network resources of the latter.
9  Rodgers and Jones (2009, p.2.). While the UN claims, that youth are people aged between 15 and 24 
some countries often due to legal regulations use a wider age frame.
10  On the uncritical transfer of drug related fears to Europe, see Weinhauer (2013).
11  Katz (2004, p.94).
12  Katz (2004, p.108).
13  Weinhauer (2017).
14  Social movements are “forms of collective self-organization for the attainment of social recognition 
and the assertion of rights or existential interests hitherto denied to a group or category of people”. 
These movements engage in “resistance against the threat of a group's or category of people's rights 
and basis of existence”. Social movements are “based on an experience of difference from the polit-
ical society and involve forms of reflexivity, engage actors in the active interpretation of the present 
and imagination of the future”, Fuchs and Linkenbach (2003, p.1525).
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In the US, against the background of a transnational fear of Bolshevism and a 
translocal “Red Scare” which evolved even before the US entered the war in 1917, 
tensions over housing and the labor market generated a severe backlash. In a society 
already mobilized by the First World War, race and ethnicity became important 
issues for the activities of localized social movements of working-class origin15. 
Locally rooted ethnic identifications intensified. White fears of the expanding Afro-
American neighborhoods fed racist attitudes, while fear of Afro- Americans as 
strikebreakers persisted. These racialized tensions often escalated into open conflict 
when demobilized soldiers returned from the war. During the years immediately 
following the First World War, such racialized urban conflicts were not confined to 
the USA but also became visible in the United Kingdom16. What was typical for these 
seaport riots were competition over jobs and housing but also the spread of rumors 
of white women being harassed by non-whites. In the USA, however, we find one 
unique organizational feature which shaped these riots. A closer look at Chicago can 
demonstrate this.
During the First World War, many Afro-Americans in the United States migrated 
from the southern states into the industrial cities of the North. Chicago was one of 
these cities. Until 1914 it had been shaped by transnational migration which then 
morphed into translocal migration from that point onwards. Chicago’s economy 
encompassed many mass production industries (meat, iron and steel, railroad) and 
was dominated by big companies Pullman (railroad); Armour and Swift (stockyards), 
and US Steel. Chicago’s Afro-American population more than doubled between 
1910 and 1920, with 90% of this new influx living in the Black Belt of South Side 
Chicago, from where they had to commute to their jobs. In some meatpacking plants 
60-70 percent of the workforce consisted of Afro-Americans17.
Initiated by booming meat sales during the Great War, from 1916 the Chicago 
stockyards saw a rising number of rank-and-file work stoppages18. In 1919 in Chicago 
an estimated 250,000 workers were involved in labor disputes during that summer 
alone. In the “windy city”, between July 1st 1919 and March 1st 1921, fifty-eight 
bombs exploded within the homes of black residents. From 27th July to 2nd August a 
riot shook the city which left 38 people dead (among them 14 whites) and 537 injured 
(342 Afro-Americans and 205 whites), and more than thousand homeless. The key 
incident was the stoning of a black boy whose raft had drifted over an imagined 
dividing line into a beach section of whites. It was this urban riot of late July and early 
August 1919, which took place at the same time as a strike in the stockyards, that 
extinguished all hopes of racial solidarity in the trade unions as well as in the city19.
A space and communication-sensitive understanding of violence helps to 
reinterpret this riot in two ways. First, the locations of racialized violence differed 
from earlier “border wars” where groups of whites had often simply marched into 
Afro-American neighborhoods, terrorized and randomly killed some inhabitants20. In 
15  For an overview, see McWhirter (2011).
16  Jenkinson (2009).
17  Cohen (1990, p.38).
18  Halpern (1997).
19  Halpern (1997, p.47).
20  For an overview, see Diamond (2009).
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summer 1919, however, there were clashes between whites and Afro-Americans in 
Afro-American and in white neighborhoods. While one third of the reported clashes 
happened in the Black Belt, a chain of neighborhoods on the South Side of Chicago, a 
further two fifths took place in the white neighborhoods near the stockyards, primarily 
along thoroughfares in these mostly Irish neighborhoods.
Second, if we closely study these acts of collective violence and ask who 
employed them we gain new insights. The violence was not simply the product of 
random individual confrontations. On the side of the mostly Irish youth, it was part of 
a masculine “culture of physical combat” practiced by groups of young, white men21. 
The established narrative has traditionally claimed that much of the violence that 
whites employed during the riot was practiced by athletic clubs or gangs, primarily 
Irish. Their attacks were aimed particularly at Afro-Americans walking to and from 
work22. Whites also used cars to block some thoroughfares and then dragged Afro-
American trolley riders into the streets and beat them.
A closer look, however, reveals that the ill-defined entity “gang” obscures many 
features which connect these groups to local society and also sets these entities 
apart from the routine functions of society. As whites imagined their neighborhood 
threatened by Afro-American migration they set out to defend their turf collectively. 
They did this through established neighborhood-based institutions. It would be much 
more precise to term them not gangs but social movements. What most studies 
ignore is that in Chicago local politics, especially elections to the city council, were 
influenced by neighborhood-based social movements far more strongly than in other 
US cities. The space-based and subculturally interwoven organizing principles of 
these urban social movements were masculinity, race and ethnicity23. They were 
mostly supported by Democratic politicians. Many of these social movements, such 
as the infamous Ragen’s Colts, were based in the Irish neighborhoods of Bridgeport 
and Canaryville that lay east of the stockyards. To get to work, African-Americans 
were forced to cross these districts, leaving them vulnerable to attacks.
In Afro-American precincts collective self-defense of their neighborhoods 
became a defining feature of the Chicago riot24. African-American war veterans 
played an important role in organizing these social movements and their collective 
actions. When the veterans came back from the war they self-consciously expected, 
not only to receive more respect but also socio-political change. Instead in many 
cities they encountered white supremacists re-establishing the former racial order. 
As Afro-American intellectual W.E.B. Dubois had predicted it in May 1919, when 
“We return from fighting. We return fighting”25. In Chicago these veterans used their 
networks of fellow war combatants to organize armed counter measures. Members 
of this militant social movement barricaded streets in their neighborhoods, stopping 
all traffic and put up sniping posts. Moreover, some Afro-American workers climbed 
onto hilltops and began firing across railway tracks into white neighborhoods. 
Whites that passed through the Black Belt were attacked. Newspapers were aware 
21  Diamond (2009, p.32).
22  Cohen (1990, p.37).
23  Diamond (2009, p.17-54); Abu-Lughod (2007, p.57).
24  Krugler (2015, p.99-130).
25  The Crisis 18, 1 (May 1919, p.14).
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of these new organizational tendencies but could only frame them in contemporary 
terms influenced by mass psychology as they wrote about white fears of “new crowd 
negroes”26. Besides transnational fears and anxieties of Bolshevism imaginaries of 
threat were also fueled by local rumors on a massive scale. Rumors spread that Afro-
American railroad workers were smuggling trainloads of firearms into the Black Belt, 
that more than seventy-five white policemen had been murdered by black gangs, and 
that white women had been raped by Afro-Americans27. These collective actions in 
post-war Chicago can demonstrate how urban space was culturally re-coded in these 
years. What many authors called a race riot more adequately should be labeled a 
spatialized violent confrontation of urban social movements. In this setting it becomes 
obvious that violence is no sign of anomie but a central element of social order.
In future research it might be rewarding to reinterpret the violence-ridden history 
of Latin American big cities from a space and communication based perspective. 
This could be combined with findings which point towards patterns of order created 
by an “insurgent citizenship” as it has been brilliantly elaborated by James Holston. 
The combination of both perspectives could avoid interpretations that things since 
the 1980s may only become worse and that all patterns of order will erode in these 
cities in the future28.
URBAN TERRORISM: VIOLENT COMMUNICATION AND MEMORY
Among contemporary urban threats terrorism looms large29. In the preceding 
section I have discussed how (mostly) male urban social movements violently 
appropriated and defended urban space (understood as physical reality and as 
imagined entity). In this section I would like to discuss the conditions under which 
urban violence during the 1970s/1980s, particularly terrorism, could be defused. 
Long before the recent attacks, political violence which was labelled as terrorism was 
performed in urban settings. Unlike contemporary suicide bomber attacks, this earlier 
terrorism often had its roots in particular social milieus and social movements. After 
the end of the Cold War many of these forms of terrorism were eventually pacified 
and defused. Employing a space-sensitive and communication-oriented perspective, I 
will, after some terminological and conceptual clarifications, take a closer look at how 
this change came about. What will hopefully become obvious is that such a question 
cannot be answered by focusing on single nation states and its cities. Terrorism and 
the fight against it are influenced by transnational and translocal transfers. Moreover, 
I would also like to show that terrorist attacks through the imaginative aspects of 
space, and the modus by which they are remembered, are closely linked.
Terrorism is a disputed term. What one side calls a freedom-fighter may by the other 
side be labeled a terrorist. In historical studies of terrorism, something of a consensus 
has recently begun to emerge. On the one hand, these authors define terrorism as a 
26  Kornweibel (1998, p.43).
27  Ibid., p.42.; see also Krugler (2015, p.129).
28  See Rodgers (2016); Holston (2008).
29  See Graham (2004); Bishop et al. (2012).
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specific form of political violence carried out by sub-state groups which plan and 
execute their politically-motivated violent actions from a semi-legal or illegal milieu 
against civilians and against state institutions. The choice of victims and the type of 
terrorist acts are of symbolic importance and are aimed at spreading insecurity and 
winning sympathy30. On the other hand this approach puts the communicative aspects 
of terrorism at the forefront: terrorism mainly is a pattern of spatial communication. 
This, however, must not be interpreted in such a way as to imply that the media 
are to blame for terrorism. Rather the main impulse of this approach is to integrate 
terrorism into a complex process of space-based communication of different actors. 
In this setting the multifold entanglements of terrorists with the state and with media 
societies are highly important.
Among the potential addressees of terrorist communication, the state is of key 
importance. Although terrorist actions also communicate to sympathizers, supportive 
milieus or even competing groups, the state in particular is forced to take action 
against terrorism, as its monopoly of physical violence is challenged. These state 
(re-)actions, in turn, are integrated into broader social processes of communication 
and are telling examples of how state actions are socially perceived. The fact that the 
actions of terrorists are publicly discussed and news of them is spread translocally 
and transnationally is a consequence of the advent of mass media societies which 
arose in Western societies during the late nineteenth century (although there were 
already debates about the power of the media and about how to control it in the early 
1800s). Thus, the agenda setting qualities of terrorism are not confined to some news 
headlines or to merely produce front-page images. Terrorism not only interacts with 
some media, but with media societies which are not confined by state borders. Media 
outlets do not only passively transmit information. Rather, they also set agendas 
by presenting, interpreting and discussing terrorist acts and related state actions. 
We must recognize, however, that the media at the same time generates follow-up 
communication. Given the key importance of communication, it can hardly come as 
a surprise that terrorism is mainly an urban phenomenon.
Although early terrorism occurred after the French revolution it was in the 
second half of the nineteenth century that (co-incident with the development of mass 
media societies) the interaction of terrorism, social movements and the state fully 
developed. Since then five overlapping phases of terrorism can be discerned 31. In 
what follows, I will focus on Northern Ireland where terrorist activity (beginning in 
the mid-1930s and continuing until the 1980s) had a strong anti-colonial focus which 
arguably define it as part of the “third phase” of terrorist violence. In addition, I will 
look at Western Germany and thus at the fourth phase of terrorism. It was associated 
with the New Left, and often closely connected to middle-class social movements 
which emerged during the manifold cultural and political upheavals ongoing from the 
1960s. This phase stretched until the demise of the socialist states in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s.
First, a highly important pre-condition for the pacification of anti-colonial terrorism 
in Northern Ireland and of West German left-wing terrorism in the 1990s was the end 
of the Cold War and of the related binary coding of the (colonial) order of the state 
30  Waldmann (1998, p.10 13); Richardson (2006, p.4ff.).
31  For the following, and for details of the periodization, see Schraut and Weinhauer (2014).
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and of society32. This opened new options for remembering political violence and its 
history. The erosion of Cold War related patterns of dichotomy made it possible to 
think about political problems and their solutions in a fresh way. Second, since the 
1990s the perception and anti-terrorist practices of the state changed. In Northern 
Ireland, the British state and its institutions lost its authority as an almighty colonial 
ruler. In Western Germany the change in the image of the state was supported by 
governmental efforts to de-militarize anti-terrorist police interventions and counter 
insurgency strategies. Moreover, in both countries repressive governmental measures 
to fight terrorism seemed to have lost credibility. Third, in the highly differentiated 
media societies of the early 2000s it became more and more problematic for terrorists 
to transmit one clear political message to the state. This mattered even more as this 
state, as I have mentioned before, had lost its demonic image. Moreover, transmitting 
one special message had to face the omnipresent and multilayered social media 
communication.
Fourth, in Western Germany and in Northern Ireland the dichotomous patterns 
of communication (them-versus-us: terrorists versus state/society) slowly eroded 
during the 1990s. Third players (local peace initiatives and victim’s organizations) 
established themselves between the state and society on the one side and the terrorists 
on the other side. Northern Ireland saw an upswing of peace-building initiatives 
on the local level. It was here in local urban settings where community and cross-
community organizations of the victims of terrorism since the early 1990s made 
themselves better heard. This was especially true if they could raise the support of local 
government. In Northern Ireland with the erosion of hermetic and supportive militant 
milieu, the local political conflicts could be put into the perspective of a world-wide 
anti-colonial struggle and its transnational and translocal symbols. In early 1990s 
Western Germany, important impulses came from relatives of victims of the Red 
Army Faction (RAF) and from political liberals. Both initiatives helped establish 
stable channels of communication between members of the opposing camps. Thus 
Western Germany witnessed an erosion of the entrenched lack of communication 
between the state and the left-wing terrorists and their milieus.
Fifth, in the 1990s, the established cultures of memory of terrorism changed33. 
The dichotomous patterns (them vs us) of remembering eroded, as public memories 
of terrorism multiplied and became dominated by individualized, often non-political 
narratives which integrated a broad spectrum of victims. In Northern Ireland the very 
hermetic local cultures of remembrance were overcome. In Germany the publication 
in the early 2000s of an increasing number of autobiographies was an expression of 
this pluralisation of memories of terrorism. Such changes in remembering terrorism 
still await further research. These processes can underline the resonance which the 
remembrance of 1970/80s terrorism still has today, but can also demonstrate the 
analytical advantages of seeing terrorist attacks as spatialized acts of communication. 
This perspective enables us to overcome the strict separation of event and memory34. 
Understood this way the study (of memories) of terrorism could tell us very much about 
the functioning of society and about the social and cultural challenges of terrorist attacks. 
32  See for the following points Weinhauer (2012); Weinhauer and Requate (2012, p.42-47); Schraut and 
Weinhauer (2014, p.23-25); Pekelder and Weinhauer (2016, p.298ff).
33  See Weinhauer and Requate (2012, p.31ff.).
34  Wagner-Pacifi (2016, p.23).
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Parallel to the aforementioned five changes, in Europe and in the USA the agenda 
of terrorism research was considerably widened though professional historians 
and authors from critical terrorism studies35. These changes of the late 1990s (thus 
obviously in place well before 9/11) marked a deep caesura in the system of academic 
knowledge about terrorism. Established Cold War scholarly narratives about political 
violence, the (nation) state and related gender codes but also about victims and patterns 
of memory were questioned. As a consequence today it is possible to consider to 
what extend the multifaceted urban consumer societies of the twenty first century 
themselves can produce potential for terrorism. It may be here where an imagined or 
real lack of sufficient participation in the promises of consumption and mobility or 
market induced insecurities may function as sources for militant actions. The latest 
terrorist attacks in French, Belgian and German cities could have been motivated by 
such factors36. Although urban settings may be sources for violence and threat, they 
also have vast potentials to create change and to positively adapt to new challenges.
Prof. Dr. Klaus Weinhauer
Faculty of History, Philosophy and Theology
University of Bielefeld, Germany
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